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TRANSITIONS IN FOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE 
FROM NATIONAL TOWARDS EU AND GLOBAL REGULATION 
AND FROM PUBLIC TOWARDS HYBRID AND PRIVATE FORMS 
OF GOVERNANCE 
 
Tetty Havinga* 
 
Abstract 
In my paper I discuss two important transitions in food governance in Europe. First, the in-
creased role of private actors in global food safety regulation and the development of retail 
driven private food safety regulation from the 1990s onwards. Second, the increased role of 
the European Union. In response to food crisis such as BSE and dioxin, the European Union 
strengthened its food safety legislation and established the European Food Safety Authority. 
At the national level, several European countries have established new regulatory agencies or 
reformed existing agencies to oversee the national food control activities. 
Both transitions resulted in very complex regulatory arrangements with multiple partners at 
multiple levels. Governmental organizations have to deal with the new circumstances and new 
core values such as transparency and independence. How do governmental agencies react to 
private standard setting? 
 
Key words 
Food regulation – food law – European union – private regulation – certification – food safe-
ty – supermarkets – public regulation 
Contextual conditions of transitions in food governance 
Food governance has changed dramatically during the past decades. National 
governmental bodies used to take the lead in rule-making and enforcing com-
pliance. This traditional command-and-control regulation by the national state 
was considered not satisfactory anymore. The globalization of the food chain, 
the growing public concern about food safety, the increased economic power 
of supermarkets and the perception of insufficient governmental regulation 
made up a fertile ground for transitions in food governance. Recent trends are 
the emergence of retailer-led food governance and of global coalitions for 
setting standards, an increased use of global business to business standards 
and of third party certification (Fulponi 2006, Hatanaki & Busch 2008, Havin-
ga 2006, Marsden et al. 2000, 2010), and a move from a prescriptive to-
wards an enforced self-regulating approach (Martinez et al. 2007). 
 
                                         
*  Paper for the workshop on Multiple partners at multiple levels: Multi level governance at 
the 8th Transatlantic Dialogue in Nijmegen, June 2012. t.havinga@jur.ru.nl. 
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Complex global food chains 
Food chains became more internationalised. In response to consumer demand, 
improved techniques for transport and storage, and growing consumer incomes, 
European retailers increasingly obtain fresh products from all over the world 
enabling a year-round supply. The food chain encompasses places of produc-
tion and trading around the globe. In my local supermarket in the Netherlands I 
find mangos from Mali, salmon from Scotland, avocados from South Africa, 
shrimps from Surinam and French beans from Kenya next to Dutch foods.  
The above examples involve just plain farm or fish products. Even fresh 
vegetables, fruits, seafood and meat are increasingly bought ready-to-eat 
(washed, cut, spiced, pre-cooked, preserved, mixed). Many food products are 
processed foods. Less than half of the food people in the US, Spain and France 
eat are unprocessed basic foods such as vegetables, fruits and meat.1 Ingredi-
ents in processed foods are not just locally obtained, but are sourced all over 
the world. The incident with milk contaminated with melamine from China in 
2008 illustrates the consequence of global sourcing of food ingredients. Mela-
mine was found worldwide in various food products: in sweets, cookies, choco-
late, baby food, pretzels, ice-cream, coffee and soya in countries such as Sin-
gapore, Indonesia, Canada, United States, the Netherlands, United Kingdom 
and Poland. These products were probably produced with an ingredient that 
contained Chinese contaminated milk.2 
Such complex global food supply chains make things difficult for govern-
mental agencies aiming at the production and marketing of safe food. This ap-
plies particularly to national governments because their jurisdiction is locked 
inside their national territory. For controlling food products and ingredients 
from outside the borders, national governments can only rely on inspections by 
foreign agencies (governmental or private) and import controls. 
                                         
1  New York Times, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2010/04/04/business/04met-
rics_g/04metrics_g-popup-v2.jpg (last consulted May 23, 2012). People in the US con-
sumed 787pounds per capita packaged food in 2009 (and 602 pounds fresh food); in 
Spain 759 pounds packaged and 621 pounds fresh food and in France 739 pounds 
packaged and 462 pounds fresh food. 
2  Kennisbank Voedselveiligheid VWA, Melamine (www.vwa.nl); David Bradley, Melamine 
contaminated food list (http://www.sciencebase.com/science-blog/melamine-conta-
minated-food-list.html) ;http://www.niernieuws.nl/?id=1747&cat=&loc=5#; http:// ev-
mi.nl/voedselveiligheid-kwaliteit/melamine-duikt-op-in-pindakoek/; http://evmi.nl/ 
voedselveiligheid-kwaliteit/ah-waarschuwt-voor-melamine-zoutjes/  (all documents con-
sulted 9-5-2012). 
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Public concern about food 
A second change during the last decades is the growing public concern about 
food. Food safety developed from a mainly technical and apolitical issue into 
a political contested issue. Food safety got heightened issue saliency after sev-
eral food related scares and disputes, such as mad cow disease, hormone-
treated meat, dioxin contamination, genetically modified foods and more re-
cently EHEC. Food risks became more visible and recognised and are subject of 
growing public concern. Food safety issues attract media attention and are de-
bated in political bodies. Loeber et al. (2012) show that framing incidents as 
‘food scare’ (in contrast to framing as environmental scandal or disaster in the 
past) goes hand in hand with institutional changes in the regulatory system in 
the European Union and in several EU member states. 
 
What is safe food? 
Safe food is food a consumer can eat without negative health consequences. 
Safe food is not identical with fresh food, organic food or healthy food. Fresh 
organic lettuce may be microbial contaminated. Several risks may be connect-
ed to food: contamination with bacteria, priones or toxic material (animal 
pharmaceutical, herbicides, dioxin), allergens and particular nutrients (sugar, 
fatty acids, unhealthy eating) (Buzby 2001, Van Kreyl & Knaap 2004).  
It is not obvious which foods are safe for consumption. The same food product  
may carry no risk at all for one consumer, and be quite dangerous for another 
consumer (due to allergic response, disease or eating habits). The ways food is 
stored and prepared can cause food disease or on the other hand kill harmful 
microbes. Risks of a particular production method or additives are not always 
known. There also might be a difference between subjective and objective 
risks. 
 
In the course of time we see changes in what is considered to be the major food 
safety issue. Between 1970 and 1990 much attention is paid to harmful chemi-
cal substances in food. After 1990 healthy food becomes the most prominent 
issue. Recently the chemical safety of food receives attention once again, next 
to health consequences of animal diseases and microbial contamination. 
Advances in scientific and technological capabilities to detect even small 
amounts of substances in food and the growing knowledge about diseases re-
lated to food add to the public perception of food safety risks. Public concern 
about food is not confined to issues of safety and health risks. Increasingly, 
claims are being made for responsibly produced food (sustainable food pro-
duction, fair trade, animal welfare and labour rights) and healthy food (sugar, 
salt, fat, additives, low calorie). 
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Market power of supermarkets 
A third change in the food sector is the increasing power of corporate retailers 
in the supply chain. Through mergers and take-overs a small number of large 
grocery retailers have gained a powerful position, both economical and politi-
cally (Marsden et al. 2010, p. 9). This concentration enables large corporate 
retailers to expand their grip on the global and domestic food supply chain. 
Supermarkets have a large majority share of the food consumers market in 
Western countries such as the Netherlands, the UK and the USA. In the UK since 
2000 the number of stores operated by the four largest grocery retailers has 
more than doubled (Tesco, Asda/Walmart, Sainsbury’s, Morrisons). By 2006 in 
the UK , 72% of all grocery sales took place in supermarkets (Marsden et al. 
2010, p.10). The growing share of own branded products reinforces the strong 
negotiating power of the retailers (Marsden 2010, p. 134). 
Perception of insufficient government regulation 
Generally traditional command-and-control regulation has been criticized for 
being ineffective, inflexible and neglecting the responsibilities of corporations 
and citizens. Similar criticism has been passed on governmental food regula-
tion. The response of the British government to the BSE crisis has often been 
cited as a manifest illustration of the incapability of the national government to 
deal with food risks. 
The BSE crisis not only revealed that the British government was not capa-
ble of dealing with the crisis. It also showed that the European Union failed to 
act adequately. BSE spread from the UK to the continent with British veal and 
cows. In the aftermath of the BSE crisis evidence of mismanagement by the 
Commission was disclosed by the Temporary Committee of Inquiry into BSE (Vos 
2000). The Commission had followed a policy of disinformation that had pre-
vented legislative activity and member states from restricting the import of Brit-
ish beef. The relevant committees had been influenced by British members and 
were under political pressure. 
In the context of these developments new forms of food governance 
emerged, including private food standards, corporate social responsibility ini-
tiatives, and transnational regulation. In the next sections I discuss two important 
transitions in food governance in Europe. First, the increased role of private 
actors in global food safety regulation and the development of retail driven 
private food safety regulation from the 1990s onwards. Second, the increased 
role of the European Union. 
Shifts towards private governance 
Due to their legal responsibility and because of fear for potential reputation 
damage in case of unsafe food products, food industry and retailers devel-
Nijmegen Sociology of Law Working Papers Series: 2012/02 
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oped initiatives for decreasing food safety risks and increasing consumer con-
fidence in safe food. In the 1990s several large food manufacturers and su-
permarket chains developed their own quality control system. In order to con-
trol the input, the companies want to make sure that the goods they purchase 
will meet particular standards and qualifications. The goods may be raw mate-
rials, parts of or semi-finished products for further manufacturing, or end prod-
ucts ready for sale. A company quality control system often included require-
ments for suppliers. For example, in the 1990s several British and Dutch super-
market chains contractually obliged suppliers to meet a comprehensive quality 
assurance standard including unexpected inspections at farms, gardens and 
plants (e.g. Albert Heijn in the Netherlands, Tesco and Sainsbury in the United 
Kingdom)(Havinga & Jettinghoff 1999, Havinga 2006). Since the 1990s pri-
vate retail standards have expanded dramatically. Food retailers joined 
forces to harmonize supplier standards. Regulation of food safety by retailers 
using quasi legislation as an instrument to force trade partners to take food 
safety measures, evolved from regulation originated from one supermarket 
chain to regulation of the united supermarkets, monitored by independent certi-
fication and inspection organizations. National private certification schemes 
have crossed borders and became global or transnational. Currently dominant 
transnational retail-driven standards are BRC, IFS, SQF and GlobalGap (Fuchs 
et al. 2011; Van der Kloet 2011). 
Retailers use their economic power to impose food safety and quality re-
quirements on their suppliers. As Grabosky (1994: 429-432) noted in his study 
on environmental regulation, ‘Large retailers are in a position to register their 
product and process preferences with suppliers, and the awesome purchasing 
power that large retailers command often carries considerable influence.’ Re-
tailers are increasingly powerful in the food chain. Suppliers are dependent on 
supermarket chains and have to comply with their requirements (Boselie et al. 
2003; Grievink et al. 2002; Havinga 2006; Marsden et al. 2000, 2010). 
Next to retail-driven-standards many other private food standards have 
emerged initiated by food industry, industrial associations, trading corpora-
tions, civil society organizations or alliances between these organisations. Their 
objective ranges from securing safe food to improving animal welfare, protect-
ing the environment, labour rights or fair trade. Examples include fair trade 
labels (Ethical Trading Initiative, Max Havelaar), substainability (Marine Stew-
ardship Council, Carbon Trust), religious food standards3 (Orthodox Union, OK 
Kosher Certification, and Ifanca, IHI Alliance), organic food labels (Ifoam, 
KRAV, EKO), food safety (FS22000, Dutch HACCP, Global red meat standard, 
                                         
3   In some Islamic countries the government is involved in setting and enforcing religious 
food laws, such as the Malaysia’s Department of Islamic Development (JAKIM). 
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Qualität Sicherheit, TrusQ), vegetarian or biodynamic labels (Vegan, Deme-
ter).4 
The systematic depiction of the variety of regulatory standard-setting (RSS) 
in their Governance Triangle provided by Abbott and Snidal (2009a) is not 
restricted to food standards. They distinguish three groups of actors directly 
involved in standard setting: states, firms and NGOs. The seven zones in the 
triangle indicate the three forms of single-actor standards, three forms of dual-
actor standards and one form involving direct participation of all three groups 
of actors. The three governance triangles illustrate the increase of standards 
that include firms and NGOs (see figure). In the pre-1985 period there are 
only a few RSS schemes, mostly in Zone 1 (state). The 1985-94 decade shows 
an emergence of RSS schemes particularly firm-schemes (zone 2), but also the 
first multi-stakeholder schemes en NGO schemes. The post-1994 period shows 
a continued proliferation of firm schemes and an increased number of NGO 
schemes and the emergence of collaborative schemes (NGOs and firms or tri-
partite, zone 6 and 7). 
 
 
Abbott and Snidal have included only six regulatory food standards in their 
governance triangle.5 However, other food standards could easily be included. 
Food regulatory schemes are (still) dominated by state regulation and by 
firm schemes. However, in the future civil actors might become more important 
in food regulation in line with the evolution described by Abbott and Snidal in 
                                         
4  See Van der Meulen 2011, Havinga 2010, Van Amstel. 
5  Marine Stewardship Council 1997, Max Havelaar 1988 (fair trade coffee) and Interna-
tional Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements 1972 (organic food), all three in 
zone 6 (dual-actor standards with involvement of firms & NGOs) and WHO Code of 
Marketing for Breast-milk Substitutes 1981 in zone 1 (state standard) (Abbott and Snidal 
2009a). GlobalGap 1997 and SQF 1994 (SafeQualityFood) in zone 2 ( Abbott and 
Snidal 2009b p 513). 
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the fields of environment, labour rights and corporate responsibility. Already, 
we can observe an increase of these actors in the food regulatory domain striv-
ing for social interests (e.g. fair trade movement), environmental interests (e.g. 
organic food movement) or animal welfare (e.g. animal rights movement). 
In these new forms of regulation, private actors are assuming pivotal roles 
in terms of rule-making, monitoring compliance, and enforcement. Food industry 
and retail corporations, in particular, have become key players in the govern-
ance of the global food system through the creation of governance institutions 
such as private standards, corporate social responsibility initiatives (CSR) and 
public-private or private-private partnerships (PPPs). 
Shifts towards EU 
The BSE crisis is often mentioned as turning point in the European Union food 
policy. In response to food crisis such as BSE and dioxin, the European Union 
strengthened its food safety legislation and established the European Food 
Safety Authority. At the national level, several European countries have estab-
lished new regulatory agencies or reformed existing agencies to oversee the 
national food control activities. 
The BSE food scare led to the awareness that the existing risk management 
and risk assessment systems in the EU failed. This worked as catalyst to reform 
the structure of EU food safety regulation. Previously, EU food policy had de-
veloped ad hoc both as part of the Common agricultural policy and as part of 
the common market. 
National food laws to combat adulteration, fraud and health risks consti-
tute trade barriers. This is the reason to harmonize food regulations within the 
common European market. At first European directives only involved intra-
Community food trade. For example, the 1964 directive on fresh meat only 
applied to establishments producing fresh meat to be marketed in another 
member state.6 In 1991 the directive is amended to extend its application to 
all slaughterhouses, cutting plants and cold stores involved in the production of 
fresh meat within member states.7 The rationale is still the common internal 
market. Next to this inclusion of producers producing for the domestic market, 
the number of issues covered by European food law has been expanded.  
The Commission responded to the accusation of lack of transparency and 
of manipulation during the BSE crisis with proposals for radical reform. The 
Commission adopted an approach emphasizing food safety and consumer pro-
tection based on three general principles: separation of the responsibility for 
legislation and for scientific advice, separation of the responsibility for legisla-
                                         
6   Directive 64/433/EEC, OJ 121,29.7.1964, p. 2012/64. 
7   Directive 91/497/EEC, OJL 268, 24.9.1991, p. 69. 
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tion and for inspection, and greater transparency and information during deci-
sion-making and inspection. The 2002 General Food Law lays down the gen-
eral principles and covers the entire food supply chain and includes not only 
food safety requirements but also issues of animal health, product quality, cat-
tle feed and sustainability. Many European directives are being replaced by 
regulations; regulations are a stronger legal form because regulations have 
direct effect (they don’t need transposition by member states in national legis-
lation to become effective).8 
Resulting landscape of food governance in Europe: How do govern-
mental agencies react to private standard setting? 
Both transitions resulted in very complex regulatory arrangements with multiple 
partners at multiple levels. Governments responded with stricter food safety 
regulations to the alleged decline in consumer confidence and the threat to lose 
export markets. Producers and suppliers became expressly primarily responsi-
ble for food safety while national governments became responsible for control-
ling the adequacy of risk controlling mechanisms of companies in a food chain.  
Governmental organizations have to deal with the new circumstances and new 
core values such as transparency and independence. How do governmental 
agencies react to private standard setting.  
Do governments participate in private standard setting? There are some 
examples of governmental actors participating in private standard setting. So 
are several national governments involved in the adaptation of GlobalGap to 
the domestic situation. But in my view, this government participation is rather 
limited. Governments do not participate in most private standards to my 
knowledge, at least in The Netherlands. Sometimes, food regulation implies a 
mix of both governmental and private actors. An example is a form of en-
forced self-regulation: to comply with legal obligations a food manufacturer or 
food-outlet is legally obliged to have a food safety system. To comply with 
that obligation the company has two options: develop and install their own sys-
tem or adopt and apply the approved hygiene code of the industrial associa-
tion. The (private) industrial association of butchers, retailers or bakery’s drafts 
a hygiene code, which is then approved by the Minister (public). Only recently 
                                         
8   Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying 
down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European 
Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety (also re-
ferred to as the General Food Law). The three basic EU food hygiene regulations are: 
Regulation (EC) 852/2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs, Regulation (EC) 853/2004 lay-
ing down specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin, and Regulation (EC) 854/ 
2004 laying down specific rules for the organisation of official controls on products of 
animal origin intended for human consumption. 
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Netherlands departments or the food authority cautiously are getting involved 
in private standard setting. They still have to find their way. But many private 
food standards have included the requirement to comply with all applicable 
national and international legislation. Looking it this way, governmental agen-
cies do not have to participate in private standard setting to have governmen-
tal ‘standards’ included. 
Another option for governmental agencies to relate to private standards, is 
incorporation of elements of private standards in public regulations. In fact this 
is what is happened to HACCP (Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point). A food 
safety system based on the principles of HACCP was mandatory in private 
food safety standards and was later incorporated in European Union legisla-
tion (respectively for meat, food stuffs and primary produce). It is a general 
pattern that legislation often (partly) lays down the state of the art (estab-
lished practices). This mechanism results in private set norms becoming public 
norms. 
Third, governments could choose to regulate the private standard setting 
process. This happens for example when international or national government 
require recognition of certification bodies or accreditation bodies. 
Are governmental monitoring and enforcement strategies adapted? Certifi-
cation agencies, private standard owners and certified firms often hope for a 
privileged treatment of certified firms by governmental food inspection and 
enforcement agencies. However, this is not reality. Dutch authorities do not rely 
on private certificates. Even private parties often do not recognize other pri-
vate certificates. The result is that a food business has to deal with several au-
ditors and inspectors. In the Netherlands recently the Food Safety Authority 
tries to reach agreement with industrial associations or large food companies. 
The Food authority wants access to all sampling and registration data from the 
private food safety system. It seems to me the governmental agencies try to 
engage private actors to act as deputy sheriffs. 
Global food and agricultural governance is increasingly being created not 
only by (inter)governmental actors but also by private actors. The transforma-
tion from traditional state regulation towards less state centred forms of regu-
lation, involved new relationships and a renewed allocation of responsibilities 
between government bodies on the one side and private actors on the other. 
These new forms are characterised by a less dominant role for the government 
and more responsibilities for private actors (Havinga 2006, Oosterveer 2005, 
Marsden et al. 2010). New forms of food regulation include not only public 
actors, but also private actors such as firms, NGOs and other organisations 
both inside and outside the production chain.  
It seems that public food safety regulation is becoming less detailed and 
less prescriptive by focusing on the obligation to provide for an adequate food 
Havinga: Conceptualizing Regulatory Arrangements 
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safety system. At the same time, important forms of private regulation are ra-
ther detailed with a high degree of intervention curtailing freedom of regulat-
ed firms. Governmental regulation could never have reached the improvements 
in food safety measures that private food standards have.  
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